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Abstract 
 
This chapter sketches the build up to the mass killing (politicide) of communists and 
communist sympathisers in Indonesia, during 1965 to 1966. Our key contribution is to explain 
why ordinary individuals, not belonging to the elite, might wish to participate in the act of 
murder. The mass murder aided the consolidation of the new order autocratic regime of 
Suharto, but his ascension to power cannot be separated from the cold war politics of the time. 
Over three decades of authoritarian rule did bring about broad based economic progress. In 
time, the authoritarian contract sustaining the regime became untenable and the contract 
lacked credible commitment in the absence of the transfer of some political power to the new 
middle class. This mirrors the modernization theory of endogenous democracy, which states 
that at higher level of income, the pressure for democracy becomes inexorable. 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Indonesia is sadly among the list of nations that have experienced mass killing 
bordering on genocide in the last half a century. Following its independence from 
Dutch rule in 1949, Indonesia was ruled by two strong men until 1998: first the 
charismatic leader Sukarno (until 1966) and then by Suharto (1966-1998).
1
 The 
genocide in question was carried out doing the transition from power via a coup d’ 
état from Sukarno to Suharto, and helped to consolidate the latter’s grip on power by 
eliminating the left wing challenge to autocratic rule. Sukarno was a staunch 
nationalist and leader of the global non-aligned movement, and therefore of necessity 
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 Sukarno was the Indonesian president during 1945-1966, however he was a dictator only during the 
period of Guided Democracy (1957-1966). Indonesia experienced a war of independence during 1945-
49 when the effectiveness of the central government was largely in question. The country adopted a 
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suspect to the West. The Indonesian case of mass murder that is analysed in this paper 
is more akin to what political scientists refer to as politicide; see definitions and 
references in Anderton (2010). While genocide refers to an attempt at liquidating 
members of a distinct national, ethnic, racial or religious group, politicide describes 
the mass murder of political opponents drawn from a political grouping, and the 
killing of communists and suspected communists in Indonesia during 1965 to 1966 
fits best in to the politicide category. The next section briefly sketches the lead up to 
these events in Indonesia, and how they unfolded in different parts of the country. It 
has to be borne in mind that this epoch represented a high point in the cold war, and 
the domino theory fed angst about the spread of the communism in East Asia.  
Anderton (2010) develops a rational choice theoretical model where genocide or 
politicide is a strategy chosen by an aggressor group in a game of power, based on 
expected payoffs where the return from eliminating a persistent rival compared with 
the cost of concessions and compromise incentivises mass killing as a dominant 
strategy. Its attractiveness can rise with imperfect information, indivisibilities, 
enforcement costs of peaceful sharing agreements and the long shadow cast by the 
disutility of the antagonist’s future existence. This choice theoretic framework for the 
aggressor group’s leadership is as it should be, but it still raises the question as to why 
individual perpetrators of genocide or politicide within the aggressor group choose to 
participate. Anderton (2010) sheds light on this issue by categorising individuals in 
the aggressor group as hardliners (eager to commit genocide), bystanders or resisters 
(to mass murder). Individual choices are based on payoffs and costs imposed by 
stronger members of the group. But there could be other deep, innate behavioural 
                                                                                                                                            
parliamentary democracy system during 1950-1957, where the executive power was held by Prime 
Ministers and the President was largely assigned a symbolic role.   
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factors that drive individual decisions to participate in the genocide, and we analyse 
these in a behavioural model in the third section of this chapter. 
Economics and politics are in practice inseparable, and the run up to mass 
murder always has economic underpinnings, as does its aftermath. In the case we are 
interested in, serious economic mismanagement, a stagnant economy and poverty 
bordering on famine characterised the period between 1957 and 1966 in Indonesia. It 
would be fair to say that per-capita GDP was lower in Indonesia compared with most 
sub-Saharan African economies, as hinted to by Myrdal (1968). What would be the 
distributional and macroeconomic consequences of the genocide? In the aftermath of 
mass killing per-capita income can rise in agrarian economies characterised by surplus 
labour provided there is not much infrastructural destruction, as is shown to be the 
case in Europe from the 14
th
 to the 17
th
 centuries (Voightländer and Voth, 2013). Will 
the leadership have an interest in growing the economy following the climacteric 
experience of mass murder? This process can be further complicated in the presence 
of natural resource rents such as oil revenues, however the economy of Indonesia 
remained dominated by agriculture particularly in the densely populated island of 
Java. In resource rich economies, the leadership has sometimes an incentive to 
diversify the economic base in the face of volatile resource rents, and in the process 
they can avoid ‘Dutch’ disease2 and make the economy grow (Dunning, 2005). 
Occasionally, the leadership has an interest in reducing regional disparities and 
poverty. These incentives appear to be present in the post-politicide Suharto ‘new 
order regime’. We analyse these factors in the fourth section of this work, followed by 
a speculative counterfactual analysis of no regime change and economic stagnation 
continuing.     
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In short, we present a theory of individual motivation to participate in collective 
action based upon the utility they derive from their group identity and how a hate 
message from a self seeking politician can spur them into action, all in the context of 
poverty and economic decline. We also look at a post-genocidal economic aftermath, 
as the politicide or genocide was part and parcel of effecting political transition and 
therefore it is important to examine the leadership's political (and economic) 
consolidation strategy. 
   
2. THE POLITICIDE OF 1965-66 
The Indonesian mass killing of the communists, communist sympathisers and 
suspected communists took place mainly between October 1965 and March 1966. The 
period was the second most momentous moment in the Indonesian history after the 
war of independence in the late 1940s; the third would be the fall of Suharto in May 
1998. With regard to fatalities of the mass killing, most scholars cite figures in the 
region of half a million deaths, although estimates vary between a hundred thousand 
to two million (Cribb, 1990, 2001). The genocide and mass killing data sets reviewed 
in chapter 3 of the volume report fatality estimates ranging from 375,000 to 750,000 
for this case (Easterly, Gatti and Kurlat, 2006). This was the end of the Indonesian 
Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia - PKI). The killing was nationally 
orchestrated by the army supported by different elements in each localities mainly 
Muslims and nationalists. The killing was concentrated in East and Central Java, 
where the PKI had its strongest base. Large scale massacres also occurred in Bali, 
North Sumatra and West Java; while killing on a smaller scale erupted in the outer 
                                                                                                                                            
2
 The Dutch disease refers an overvalued currency and other mechanisms that hamper the development 
of all other sectors beyond resource extraction, often leading to growth failure; see Warr (1986). 
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islands of Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Nusatenggara. Unfortunately, the mass 
killing received far less academic scrutiny compared with its pretext.  
 
2.1 The pretext 
The pretext for the Communist purge was the September 30
th
 Movement, a 
one-day affair that took place in Indonesian capital, Jakarta.  In the early morning of 1 
October 1965, six high ranking army generals and a lieutenant were abducted and 
murdered by a group of conspirators in the Indonesian army. Consisting of young 
progressive officers led by a lieutenant colonel, the group announced that they acted 
to safeguard President Sukarno from a coup planned by a right-wing Council of 
Generals. By the early evening of that day, the movement was put down by the Army 
under the leadership of the senior surviving Army general, Major General Suharto, 
and the mass killing ensued. It was the start of Sukarno’s loss of grip on the 
Presidency, and Suharto’s seizure of state power. It has to be noted that the 
assassination of six army generals was more than simply a ‘pretext’ as it had a 
lingering transformative effect on the Indonesian politics for decades to come: the 
battle between left and right has not resumed in Indonesian politics even after nearly 
two decades since the fall of Suharto in 1998.   
The movement could be seen as an internal Army affair in the form of a 
mutiny. The group of Left-leaning young officers received political support from the 
chairman of PKI who secretly discussed the issue with a handful of the party’s 
Politburo members. The September 30
th
 Movement was never a policy of the party as 
it was never been discussed in the party’s central committee (Roosa, 2006). However, 
PKI as an institution was blamed by the Army for puppet-mastering the movement; 
therefore, logically, the Party had to be destroyed down to its roots. This was the 
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rationale for the ensued mass killing. Roosa (2006) concludes that the movement was 
a mutiny; it was a purge of the Army’s high command by lower ranking military 
officers. The movement was not a coup; the reaction to the movement by the Army 
under the leadership of General Suharto who finally seized power from Sukarno could 
be seen as a coup. They used the movement as a pretext to break the power of both the 
PKI and Sukarno.   
The head to head collison between the PKI and the Army was rooted in the 
years preceding the movement, dating back to the start of Sukarno’s guided 
democracy in 1957. Although Indonesia was one of the initiators of the Non-Aligned 
Movement, Sukarno showed his increasingly anti-Western policy and moved towards 
a Hanoi-Peking-Moscow alliance. Sukarno was supported by two competing 
dominant powers around him, the largely anti-communist Army and the Indonesian 
Communist Party (PKI).   
In 1965, the PKI was at the peak of its political performance. It was the largest 
and the most organised political party in the country with a very strong cadre system 
and grass root base. It secured fourth position with 16 percent of the vote in the 1955 
national elections, won a majority of the Javanese votes in the 1957 regional elections 
(with only 27 percent) and enjoyed Sukarno’s political support. Sukarno was at the 
height of his grand idea to bring together three dominant political forces; nationalist, 
religious (Islamists) and communist. The PKI was the largest communist party outside 
the Soviet Union and China. At that time, many believed that the PKI would win the 
plurality of votes if elections were held again (Roosa, 2006). 
The Army was the only viable force that challenged the growing PKI 
influence nationwide. Sukarno, who was not able to fully control the Army, but used 
the PKI to keep a balance. The Army was aware that Sukarno was not on their side 
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and did not directly challenge Sukarno because of his very strong political base, but 
waited for a right moment to do so. The September 30
th
 Movement provided the 
perfect opportunity.   
Indonesian society and politics in the mid-1960s was deeply polarised between 
pro and anti- Communists. With such macro setting of the mass killing, Roosa (2006: 
224) concludes, ‘we are dealing with a boxer who not only knocks out his opponent in 
the ring but goes on to attack all of that boxer’s fans in the stadium, then hunts down 
and attacks his opponent’s fans throughout the country, even those living far away 
who had not even heard about the match.’ However, the above boxing analogy could 
be spurious as Roosa tries to suggest that the politics of Guided Democracy was as 
normal as, say, U.S. politics. The army versus PKI conflict was a contest for the soul 
of Indonesia, a struggle in which both sides were vicious and ruthless. It had its roots 
in the ideologically irreconcilable differences of nationalists, Islamists and 
communists that brought the Indonesian parliamentary democracy to an end in 1957, 
when Sukarno introduced the Guided Democracy.  
 
2.2. The mass killing  
The mass killing of suspected Communists was centrally orchestrated by the 
Army, where the Army’s Special Force unit (Resimen Para Komando Angkatan 
Darat - RPKAD) played a central role. It began with quickly putting down the 
movement in Jakarta in the evening of 1 October 1965. And then, the mass killing 
throughout the country followed. Although orchestrated by the Army, the role of 
civilians was crucial in the massive scale of killing. The civilians who participated in 
the killings were usually members of militias who had received training from the 
military, along with weapons, vehicles, and assurances of impunity. The mass killing 
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was accompanied by mass detentions of suspected communists, mostly without trials.  
In the mid-1970s, it was estimated that around one million were detained for alleged 
involvement with the PKI (Friend, 2003).  
In Central Java, the RPKAD played a leading role in organizing anti-communist 
violence. Its commander, Colonel Sarwo Edhie Wibowo, in person joined his troops 
in the capital city of Central Java, Semarang, on 19 October. On that night, RPKAD 
detained more than 1,000 people and encouraged youths from religious groups 
(Nahdatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah and the Catholic Party) and nationalist group 
(Indonesian National party - PNI) to attack communist and Chinese buildings in 
Semarang. The pattern of the RPKAD operation, mass detention and rioting by anti-
communist groups against PKI and ethnic Chinese were soon repeated in towns 
throughout Central Java and Yogyakarta. Due limited military personnel to carry out 
the mission, RPKAD trained and armed religious and nationalist militias. The 
operation in Central Java was closely monitored by General Suharto who toured the 
province in mid-November (Jenkins and Kammen, 2012).   
The story of the mass killing in East Java is a bit different, although the Army 
played a key role; much of the violence was carried out by members of the 
traditionalist Muslim mass organization, Nahdatul Ulama (NU) (Fealy and Mc 
Gregor, 2012). The violence was the outcome of heightened polarization between the 
Islamists and the communists in Indonesian society. East Java was the strongest based 
of NU but facing growing challenge from the PKI that posed a big threat to the socio-
economic standing of NU elites. While the PKI represented landless farmers, peasant 
and the poor, the NU was backed by big land owners and merchants. Fealy and Mc 
Gregor (2012) argue that political and socio-economic factors were more important 
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than religion, although, among NU followers, religion was often used as a central 
justification of the killing.    
By the end of 1965, it is estimated that around 100,000 people had been 
murdered and 70,000 detained in Centra Java, while some 200,000 people had been 
massacred and some 25,000 detained in East Java (Kammen and McGregor 2012).   
In Bali, supporters of the nationalist PNI party conducted most of the killing. 
The arrival of the Special Force in December 1965 coincided with the rapid 
intensification of the killing in the province. Between December 1965 and February 
1966, the mass killing took the lives of some 80,000 Balinese representing 5 percent 
of the island’s population (Robinson, 1995); Bali recorded the highest rate of killing 
per capita in the event of 1965-66.   
In West Kalimantan, the Army used civilian paramilitaries to proscribe 
communists creating an inter-ethnic pogrom; ethnic Dayaks were mobilised to hunt 
down ethnic Chinese in rural areas where around 100,000 were expelled and some 
3,000 killed (Davidson and Kammen, 2002).  
Elsewhere, numbers of casualties were far lower than in East Java, Central Java 
and Bali. In North Sumatra, it is estimated that some 15,000 were killed and another 
15,000 detained, with some anti-Chinese nature of the killing as in West Kalimantan. 
In West Java, less than 10,000 were killed and 10,000 detained. A few thousand were 
killed in South Sulawesi ((Kammen and McGregor 2012).     
The Communist genocide was not only the main part of the overall attack on the 
Indonesian left, Sukarno, as well as his social base and ideals, but it should also be 
viewed from a larger process of re-integration of Indonesia into the capitalist world 
economy.  The Communist party’s destruction was welcomed and supported by the 
West (Simpson, 2008).  
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The event of the mass killing must be situated within the global polarization in 
the context of the Cold War between the US led Western capitalist bloc and the Soviet 
led communist. The real battle actually took place in the newly de-colonized 
developing world and Indonesia was very much part of it. As commonly found in 
other newly independent countries in Asia and Africa after World War II, left leaning 
nationalistic policies were a dominant feature in many of those countries. The reaction 
by the West was often to encourage Western oriented military dictatorships to take 
power. Therefore, Suharto’s rise to power in Indonesia was similar to the stories of 
Mobutu in Zaire (Congo DR) and Pinochet in Chile (Schmitz, 2006).   
 
3. INDIVIDUAL MOTIVATION TO PARTICIPATE IN THE GENOCIDE 
The objective of this section is to provide a choice theoretic framework as to 
why individuals may partake in non-conformism, extremism and even mass murder. It 
has to be emphasised that we shall be positing a spectrum of activity ranging from 
non-conformist acts to violence. We begin with an individual who derives direct 
utility from actions related to their identity, including faith related actions. We then 
show, how group or peer pressure can make the individual conform to a group norm. 
We then analyse how a hate message from a (self-seeking) can galvanise threatened 
members of the group into collective action, including mass murder and genocide. 
Mobilisation, in this regard, is aided by the presence of poverty and socioeconomic 
disadvantage. In this way, we hope to demonstrate and provide a theoretical 
explanation for individual participation in genocidal acts utilising the toolkit of 
rational choice theory. Similar foci on why individuals may choose to become suicide 
bombers can be found in Iannaccone (2006) and Wintrobe (2006).    
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In the model below related to the paradigm in Murshed (2011) there are two 
groups: Muslims, who facilitated by the military government might perpetrate 
genocide on their ideological opponents, the communists. We model individual 
Muslim motivation to take action against communists based on prior beliefs and 
current signals, moving from there to Muslim collective action in this regard. Of 
course, not all Muslims will engage in killing. We, thus, begin with individual Muslim 
motivation to participate in direct action against communists, followed by alienated 
group dynamics leading to genocide. This is based both on socially induced and 
innate behavioural considerations, as well as a pecuniary component. 
As far as individuals are concerned, following Akerlof and Kranton (2000), we 
postulate that individuals directly obtain utility from their identity, and the behaviour 
demanded by that sense of belonging. Thus, an individual member (r) of a Muslim 
group derives utility (Ur) from identity related actions in the following manner
3
: 
 
),,(
)(),,(
jrrr
rorjrsr
ssII
where
rjkUIssUU

 
       (1) 
 
Here the parameter s refers to principal (Muslim) identity based actions, which 
yield utility (Us) from actions (sr), as well as utility (Uo) from other identity based 
actions, kr as a good Indonesian citizen who does not behave extremely in the cause of 
his religion. The former is like a club good, and the latter similar to a private good. 
These two enter individual utility in an additive and separable fashion. Unlike in 
Akerlof and Kranton (2000), an individual is permitted to possess multiple identities 
(Sen, 2008), and corresponding to these are additive separable inputs into his utility 
function, which is an innovation of this model. The individual not only derives utility 
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 The utility function that follows is in terms of behavioural actions, not consumption.  
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from a vector of his own actions (sr), but also similar actions of other like-minded 
individuals belonging to his group (sj), and above all his own identity or self image 
(Ir), which in turn depends on the actions (sr, sj) just described, as well as another 
parameter inciting hatred of the communist ‘other’, μ. This has similarities with 
Boulding’s (1956) concept of image. Boulding regards image to be the basis of 
behaviour. Image, including self-image, is always subject to messages, akin to signals, 
which can either be internalised or lead to changes in the image, which, on occasion, 
can be quite dramatic or revolutionary.  
Sr denotes the total endowment of possible individual actions divided up 
amongst Muslim identity and nationalist citizenry based actions: 
 
rrr ksS  )(          (2) 
It is postulated that the attractiveness of inputs into own-identity type behaviour (sr) 
rises with μ. 
Following Akerlof and Kranton (2000) it is also possible to show that 
individuals derive disutility from the non-conformity of other group members. 
Secondly, if the costs of so-doing are low compared with the pain inflicted on errant 
members, individuals of a group will exert effort to bring back members who have 
strayed from ideal group behaviour back to the fold, as analysed by Akerlof and 
Kranton (2000). Such behaviour can also be said to describe the strategies adopted by 
conflict entrepreneurs amongst Muslim groups who are bent on confrontation. If 
another group member (j) suffers disutility (Ij) from other-identity based behaviour 
(kr) by person r, they may lure the errant individual back to the fold provided that the 
cost of doing so to themselves (cj) is not too large and is less than the loss inflicted (lr) 
on the deviant group member through a cooperative game. If the loss or punishment to 
 13 
the deviant member is too great than then he may not conform to group behaviour at 
all, choosing permanent exit. It requires the condition:  
rjj lIc            (3) 
This condition above is more likely to hold amongst poor communities 
suffering from widespread poverty and low human capital (educational) endowments, 
living in close proximity. Moreover, the Muslim group may use the behaviour 
denoted in (3) to resolve mutual mistrust, the collective action problem as described 
by Olson (1965). Thus, group grievances become individual grievances, and 
individuals act upon their collective grievances. This, at the extreme, can induce 
genocidal acts similar to choices made about suicide bombing outlined in Wintrobe 
(2006), with kr = 0.  
We now turn to the determination of hatred of the communists, μ. The 
parameter μ denotes a spectrum of dislike to hatred which in the extreme can induce 
homicidal behaviour. A higher μ implies more confrontative attitudes, including at the 
extreme genocide or politicide. Following Glaeser (2005) we can think of μ as 
originating in a signal sent out by a politician or military group. They may 
deliberately send out a false hate message as a way of consolidating their hold on 
power, by encouraging others to eliminate their opponents. Its attractiveness to the 
public will depend on their need for scapegoats and their own personal life 
experiences of the ‘other’. Not all these signals will be believed: for example, some 
hate mongering politicians may be mistrusted, the better educated among the public 
may discount part of the message and others with greater knowledge based upon 
personal interaction may similarly disregard this signal. There is a cost (z) to 
individuals of verifying the veracity of the signal through a search process. Let φ be 
the probability that the politician is sending out a false message and the communist 
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group in question is largely innocent; 1 – φ is the probability that they are not, and 
will therefore impose a net cost μ on members of the Muslim community. Individuals 
update their Bayesian prior for this in the following manner: 
 


)1( 
         (4) 
 
The prior may be updated subject to the aforementioned search cost z, and 
other exogenous events like riots and acts of terrorism (close to home) perpetrated by 
communists. The public is composed of two types: a high cost type (indexed by 
subscript h) who both suffer greater potential damage (μ) and also have higher search 
costs (z); and, a low cost type (subscript l) who suffer less disutility from a potential 
communist threat and have lower search costs of finding out the truth (because of 
education, say). The former may include the less educated, the more socio-
economically disadvantaged, and those who would like to find scapegoats for their 
poverty and vulnerability. In general: 
 
typestlowforzand
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lhiizzyV
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


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
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

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          (5) 
 
Where V represents expected (pecuniary) utility and y income of individuals of 
i = h,l types, diminished by μ and z costs. Maximization of this expected utility with 
respect to search (z) leads to the conditions described in the second and third lines of 
(5) respectively. The high cost type of individual suffers both a greater perceived loss 
from communists (μh) and has a higher cost of verification of the signal (zh). This is all 
the more so, if the search costs of verifying the signal entail an earlier lumpy fixed 
cost in education, say. These individuals are more likely to abandon the search for 
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truth in favour of the hate message, setting φ = 0. Even the low cost type individual 
(who will engage in the search for truth) may at certain times randomise the 
probability of φ around 0 or 1, if say equilibrium φ ≈ 1/2 in (5). Also, after major 
incidents like a communist uprising or a famine, all individuals from the majority 
community may set φ to zero for a certain time, effectively tarring all communists and 
quasi-communists with the same brush. If enough Muslims believe the signal then 
collective action against communists becomes more likely.  
Muslim group behaviour is arrived at after summing the choices regarding sr 
from individual utility maximization described in (1), subject to constraints (2): 
 
es
n
r
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1
                                        (6) 
 
For collective action (like a club good) to take place via the adoption of the 
group strategy (e), a critical threshold of aggregate own-identity based actions, ∑sr, 
must be chosen. Not all individuals will engage in own-identity based actions, and not 
all actions (sr) are violent. In order to keep the analysis tractable, we do not specify an 
exact tipping point where actions turn violent or genocidal, choosing to focus on a 
continuum instead. The forging of collective action requires high enough values of e; 
condition (3) must also hold so that it is not too costly to deter non-own-identity based 
actions through cooperative games; at high enough values of μ condition (3) becomes 
more relaxed, as more self-enforcing and sincere own-identity based behaviour takes 
place via (2). Note that e also denotes a continuum of peaceful actions, which is the 
converse of violence. 
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The Muslim group, objective or utility function, R, takes the following form: 
 
)())(1(),( eERReaR CP                             (7) 
where: 
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The superscripts p and c refer to states which are more peaceful and 
confrontative, with probabilities π and 1- π respectively. The probability of peace rises 
with an action (e) by the dissident group, and (a) on the part of the communists to be 
outlined below. Note that the probabilities increase with rising efforts and actions 
such that πe, πa > 0, but with diminishing returns such that πee, πaa < 0. Both group 
strategies are a hybrid of accommodation and aggression. R
P
 and R
C
 describe Muslim 
group pay-offs in the two states, with utility greater in peaceful states. Utility is 
derived from income (Y
R
), and a transfer (T) obtained from the state.  Strategic 
choices surround e (effort with regard to peace) obtained from (6); fighting, F
R
, is 
greater when the parameter µ rises implying greater hatred for communists. This can 
happen if there are exogenous events increasing poverty, food shortages, communist 
bids to seize power or encouragement from the state towards hatred.  E describes the 
aggregate cost function for undertaking e, composed of psychic costs of ‘capitulation’ 
and the total costs of inducing own-identity based behaviour in (3), with Ee and Eee > 
 17 
0. Note that as e rises there is more peace with the communists; a decline in e defines 
greater militancy.  
Collective group behaviour, via the group strategy, e, is akin to a club or 
associational good (Cornes and Sandler, 1996). A club good is excludable in nature, 
only those who subscribe or contribute can partake in it. It is ‘voluntary’ because 
individuals do not have to participate, unlike in the case of non-excludable pure public 
goods. With club goods, membership and provision are inseparable. Differentiating 
the dissident group’s strategic variable (e) in (8) we find: 
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                   (9) 
 
The first term on the right-hand side of (9) is positive, e rises with T, but falls with μ.  
 
The Muslim group will maximise (7) with respect to e, equating its marginal benefit 
to marginal cost: 
 
  eCPe ERR  (.)(.)                    (10) 
 
 
Ignoring individual communist member behaviour, which can be argued to be similar 
to the Muslim group, the utility of the communist group is given by: 
 
)())(1(),( aCGGeaG CP         (11) 
where:  
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G
P 
and G
C
 refer to exogenous pay-offs to the communists in the two states with G
P 
>G
C
 due to conflict induced loss of endowments and transfers.  
 
C refers to the cost of undertaking peaceful actions a by the communists, Ca > 0. 
These costs consist of pecuniary and non-pecuniary elements; the first because of the 
loss of ‘power’; the latter because of a political cost by alienating those in the group 
opposed to accommodation. The communists maximise (11) with respect to a: 
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Equations (10) and (13) form the basis of the reaction functions for both sides, 
obtained by totally differentiating them with respect to a and e. Thus: 
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And 
 
 
00
)()(
)()(
/ 





 aePC
aaaa
CP
ae
G
if
GGC
GG
Rde
da



    (15) 
 
Note that ae = ea by symmetry.  
 
The reaction functions are positively sloped if ae > 0, implying that the two 
strategies are complements. In other words, they represent a tit for tat strategy on the 
part of both antagonists; if one side behaves more peacefully its opponent does the 
same, and vice versa. This is the standard assumption in the literature on conflict. It 
means that increases in fighting or peaceful efforts by one side are matched in the 
same direction by the other side. In our model, however, we allow for the possibility 
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that ae < 0, the choice variables are strategic substitutes, and the reaction functions 
could slope downwards (Figure 1). This can only occur because the strategy space is 
defined in terms of peace. Thus, if one side behaves more peacefully, because it feels 
weaker or is on the defensive, it increases the utility of both parties, and the other side 
may free ride on this expected response by actually reducing their own action. Note 
that the free riding does not necessarily lead to a rise in the equilibrium level of 
conflict, as the side raising its efforts may compensate more than proportionately for 
the group lowering their action.  
An increase in poverty induced or government sponsored hatred of 
communists, will shift the reaction function of the Muslim group (R
R
0 to R
R
1) along 
the reaction function of the communists (R
G
0), and the equilibrium will move from A 
to B in figure 1. Here the communist behave more peacefully or defensively, but the 
Muslim group does the converse, and genocide or politicide of communists could 
ensue. Should the cost of peaceful behaviour rise exogenously for the communists as 
well, their reaction function could move down, with a new equilibrium at C. Genocide 
occurs when e = 0, but the strategic value of a is not necessarily equal to zero, 
implying a corner solution. 
 20 
 
 
 
4. THE ECONOMIC AFTERMATH: MACROECONOMY AND POVERTY-
INEQUALITY 
 
Two decades after independence, the Indonesian economy in the mid-1960s 
was characterised by widespread poverty and stagnant growth. Indonesia reflected the 
general trend in Africa and elsewhere in the developing world, where the early post-
independence eras were periods of decline caused by violence, political instability and 
poor growth record (Van Zanden and Marks, 2012). Indonesia was pre-occupied with 
politics at the time.   
According to an academic observer, T.K. Tan, writing in 1967, the heart of the 
problem lay with President Sukarno's inability to grasp the saliency of sound 
economic management. “Sukarno was accustomed to live with the conviction that, 
economically illiterate as he was, the President should not be held responsible for the 
economic wellbeing of the nation. Such responsibility should rest with his team of 
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economic advisers” (Tan, 1967: vii). In January 1967, a cabinet minister frankly 
declared that ‘one of Sukarno’s sins is his ignorance of economics’ (Tan, 1967: viii).   
The Indonesian political independence officially gained in late 1949 after a 
four year war of independence was not followed by economic independence. There 
was a huge problem relating to the transition from the colonial primary export 
economy into a national economy. In the 1950s, it is estimated that the Dutch owned 
segment of the Indonesian modern economic sector accounted for 25 percent of 
national GDP and 10 percent of total employment (Higgins, 1990).  
The period that follow could be divided into two. The first is the period of 
parliamentary democracy (1949-1957), where Sukarno’s largely played a role of 
symbolic solidarity maker, while the executive was headed by a Prime Minister. The 
second is the period Guided Democracy (1957-1965), where Sukarno turned into a 
dictator.    
The newly independent Indonesia inherited the colonial economic structure 
with a classically dual economic system consisting of modern capitalist economic 
enterprises run by Dutch colonialists mainly in the forms of plantation agriculture, 
shipping and trading companies; and the traditional subsistence peasant economy with 
a weakly developed indigenous merchant class (Boeke, 1953). The two were hardly 
interlinked except from the perspective of labour supply.   
Economic performance, however, was tolerable during 1949-1957 with total 
GDP and per capita GDP annually grew at 5.5 per cent and 2.9 per cent respectively 
(Table 1). The dual economy largely continued during this period, where the modern 
colonial capitalist enterprises significantly contributed to growth. While the 
government tried to expand their role in the modern economic sector, the successive 
prime ministers from different parties during the period were very cautious about any 
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policies to nationalise foreign (colonial) enterprises aware of potential damage the 
policy might have.  
The situation significantly changed in 1957 when Sukarno started to become a 
dictator with his vision of guided democracy and guided economy. Due to this, 
Mohamad Hatta tendered his resignation after serving as Sukarno’s Vice President 
since independence. A series of measures during the 1950s were undertaken to reduce 
Dutch predominance in the Indonesian economy culminating in the unilateral 
nationalization of all Dutch enterprises in 1957-1959 followed by the British and 
Americans in 1963-1965. Between 1967 and 1965, nearly all foreign-owned 
enterprises were taken over by the state (Gibson, 1967). These state owned enterprises 
were run by military officers not familiar with running commercial enterprises 
efficiently. Parallel to the effort to reduce the remaining colonial economic role, 
measures to limit economic roles of ethnic Chinese were also part of the creation of 
the national economy. This ultra nationalist economic policy of nationalisation 
destroyed the productive capacity of the already thin modern economic sector of the 
country, akin to Robert Mugabe’s move to nationalise Europeans owned plantations 
in Zimbabwe.     
There two measures, nationalization of Dutch enterprises and limiting the 
business dominance of ethnic Chinese, significantly contributed to the deterioration of 
the Indonesian economy during the course of Sukarno’s guided democracy (1957-65) 
without the emergence of indigenous Indonesian entrepreneurs. The first affirmative 
policy of the Benteng (fortress) program in the 1950s aimed at promoting indigenous 
Indonesian entrepreneurs was unsuccessful. Indonesian economic policies in the 
1950s could be characterised as socialist-leaning economic nationalism as commonly 
found in most of newly de-colonised countries in Asia and Africa after World War II.  
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Writing in the 1960s, Gunnar Myrdal was pessimistic about the development 
prospects for Indonesia, although his main focus was India (Myrdal, 1968). He 
believed that the traditional power structures were likely to endure and the chances of 
economic take off were slim. This was largely because the government was too soft, 
and unable to impose discipline needed to implement development plans. Myrdal 
concluded that democracy might not be the best system to achieve the desired 
development progress and that authoritarian regimes might do it better. In fact, 
Sukarno’s authoritarian turn to guided democracy in 1959 after the country’s 
experiment with the Western-style liberal democracy during the 1950s was in line 
with Myrdal’s assessment, albeit with an anti-Western tone and rather narrow 
nationalistic orientation. The new Suharto regime that ruled the country after the mass 
killing was essentially a continuation of the authoritarian regime, but with a clear 
Western orientation, openness to foreign capital investing mainly in natural resource 
exploitation, and more importantly the harnessing of available ethnic Chinese 
entrepreneurship.  
Politically, the Sukarno’s guided democracy preserved the unity of the 
country. In early 1960s, a series of regional rebellions were put down and Sukarno 
successfully integrated West Papua, as the last remaining former Dutch colony in 
Southeast Asia, to Indonesia. However, the period was a total economic failure as 
presented in Table 1. The decline in GDP growth and the decline in growth rates 
across all sectors during the 1957-1966 period are dramatic. This indicates how 
economic decline and malaise correlate with genocide and mass atrocities (GMA), as 
in the Armenian and Rwandan cases; catastrophic economic conditions seem to 
accompany the increased risk of GMA.  
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In 1959, a first major economic program initiated under the guided economy 
was sandang- pangan (fulfilment of basic needs such food, clothing and other 
necessities for the people). By 1964, the sandang-pangan program was totally 
abandoned and Sukarno’s shifted the discourse to the absurd ‘nation and character 
building’ away from the real economic problem of the basic needs of the people. At 
the end of Sukarno’s effective presidency in early 1966, sandang-pangan remained 
the country’s principle economic problem (Tan, 1967).      
In 1965, Indonesia was among the poorest economies in the world, with a very 
dominant agriculture sector and very small manufacturing industry (Table 2). 
Between 1950 and 1967, the central government ran budget deficits in all years except 
in 1951 and 1952. The periods 1965-67, as well as 1957-66, were economically 
disastrous (falling real per-capita income) significantly contributing to the political 
drama of 1965-66. Sukarno misjudged the dire political consequences of the 
economic decline (Van Zanden and Marks, 2012).    
 
Table 1. Sectoral real GDP growth (annual average percent), 1949-1966 
Sector 1949-1966 1949-1957 1957-1966 
Agriculture  2.5 2.4 2.7 
Manufacturing   5.1 10.9 0.3 
Oil and gas 8.4 12.9 4.5 
Trade 3.8 5.9 2.1 
Transport  2.4 7.3 -1.7 
Government  0.4 6.8 -4.9 
Other services 3.0 4.5 1.8 
Total services 3.0 5.5 0.9 
    Total GDP 3.5 5.5 1.8 
Non oil-gas GDP 2.2 4.3 0.4 
GDP per capita  1.0 2.9 -0.6 
Source: Van Zanden and Marks (2012: 151, Table 7.5) 
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Table 2. Indonesia in 1965 in a comparative perspective 
  
GDP per capita 
(1990 international 
dollars) 
Trade (as 
% of 
GDP) 
Agriculture 
(as % of 
GDP) 
Indonesia 983 24 53 
South Korea 1436 27 36 
Malaysia 1804 80 29 
Taiwan 1810 41 24 
Thailand 1308 35 32 
    South Asia 763 21 40 
Sub-Sharan 
Africa 1099 43 39 
Latin America 3709 36 21 
Source: Van Zanden and Marks (2012: 168, Table 8.1) 
 
 
 
The new military centred authoritarian regime of Suharto was fully aware of 
the political weaknesses embedded in the previous Sukarno’s authoritarian guided 
democracy. After totally eliminating the left in Indonesian socio-political life,  
Sukarno’s grand idea of accommodating three dominant social forces --nationalist, 
religion (Islamist) and communist—was further dismantled while keeping an artificial 
façade of democracy as a lip service. The military-created functional group party 
(Golongan Karya - GOLKAR) was designed to win elections since the first elections 
conducted by Suharto’s regime. The nationalist and Islamist parties were grouped into 
two new parties making up only three political parties (GOLKAR, nationalist and 
Islamist) allowed to contest elections during three decades of Suharto’s rule. The 
GOLKAR enjoyed full support from the military and the bureaucracy was deliberately 
designed to win in every election, while the other two parties were suppressed, but 
continued to barely exist. This was ironical, given the support provided by militias 
from the Islamist and nationalist groups to the Army in conducting the mass killing.  
The capitalist (free market) military dictatorship concealed within a pseudo 
democracy was able to offer sort of stability. Although society was forced to accept 
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the authoritarian rule and political freedom was not brought back, unlike the situation 
in the 1950s prior to the guided democracy, the Suharto regime, in return, delivered a 
broad-based increased in socio-economic prosperity across the archipelago; this has 
been labelled as a Hobbesian bargain (Liddle, 1999). Between late-1960s and mid-
1990s, average per capita income more than quadrupled, the poverty head count 
dropped from 70 percent to only 13 percent, infant mortality dropped from 159 to 49 
per thousand live births, the adult illiteracy rate fell from 61 percent to 14 percent and 
inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient of expenditure, was broadly stable, 
varying between 32 and 35: low by international standards (UNDP, 2001).    
The relatively remarkable socio-economic performance of the Suharto’s 
military dictatorship despite its highly corrupt nature merits further explanation. First, 
this reflects the overall superiority of outward-looking liberal capitalist economic 
system vis-à-vis inward looking socialist central planning approach to development. 
The former largely characterized economic policies in the context of East Asian 
miracle, while the latter can be associated with the poor economic performances of 
pre-1979 reformed China and pre-1991 reformed India. Second, authoritarian political 
stability, albeit at the expense of political rights of the Indonesian left, secured the 
economy under a strong state without unnecessary political noise. This probably 
echoes Myrdal’s preference for an (effective) authoritarian regime allowing for 
economic gains. Third, Suharto’s decision to appoint capable technocrats to run the 
economy played a major role. During the course of his regime, the group of 
technocrats were able to manage the economy in relative isolation from day-to-day 
politics. And to their credit, the oil boom in the 1970s provided fresh financing for the 
development and the economy avoided ’Dutch’ disease.  
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After assuming power, Suharto’s main economic priority was to chalk up 
stabilisation and rehabilitation programmes, aimed at providing guidelines for 
Indonesia’s economic recovery and specific policies on a balanced budget, the 
balance of payments, rehabilitation of physical infrastructure and agricultural 
development. These were helped by foreign investment, foreign aid and the overall 
international orientation of the economy. Growth performance in the earlier period of 
the Suharto’s new order proved to be the most impressive (Table 3). In a comparative 
perspective, overall the new order was regarded as an economic success story (World 
Bank, 1993; ADB, 1997).       
 
Table 3. Sectoral economic (annual average percent) growth, 1967-1996 
Sector 1967-1996 1967-1972 1972-1980 1980-1986 1986-1996 
Agriculture  4.1 5.2 4.7 3.3 3.5 
Manufacturing   10.8 12.7 10.3 9.1 11.3 
Oil and gas 3.7 16.5 4.8 -3.7 1.6 
Trade 7.6 8.9 7.8 4.4 8.9 
Transport  7.1 5.8 7.3 6.4 8.1 
Government  10.7 20.5 17.5 6.2 3.7 
Other services 6.8 5.7 5.7 5.6 8.9 
Total services 7.4 7.7 8.0 5.4 8.0 
      Total GDP 6.9 10.2 6.8 3.8 7.6 
Non oil-gas GDP 7.4 8.0 7.3 5.3 8.4 
GDP per capita  5.2 6.5 4.7 2.8 6.5 
Source: Van Zanden and Marks (2012: 169, Table 8.2) 
 
The above trend hinting at the economic supremacy of authoritarian 
government, however, could not be assumed as a generic pattern of Western-backed 
military dictatorships emerging from the Cold War. In this regard, the contrasting 
experiences of Suharto’s Indonesia and Mobutu’s Zaire, as discussed in Dunning 
(2005), are telling examples. In Indonesia, after eliminating the left for an obvious 
reason and sidelining the Islamists and the nationalists due to potential threats they 
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might pose to the regime, Suharto deliberately opted for economic diversification 
away from reliance on a natural resource based economy (chiefly petroleum) and 
chose to pragmatically align with minority ethnic Chinese for their private sector 
entrepreneurial skills. The Chinese community in Indonesia represented an 
economically powerful but politically weak community who would not challenge 
Suharto’s leadership. Providing them with incentives and other public goods to 
develop the import competing sector resulted in economic diversification away from 
the natural resource export dependence.  
It has to be borne in mind that natural resource rents are subject to sharper 
cyclical behaviour over the business cycle, and are subject to episodes of boom and 
bust. This implies that the growth rates, as well as government revenue and patronage 
rents for the elite are volatile. Indonesia managed to also avoid many of the features 
of the economic Dutch disease, associated with resource dependent economies as 
pointed out by Warr (1986). For example, it carried out a devaluation of its currency 
as early as November 1978 to maintain the competitiveness of the domestic import 
competing sector at a time when most all oil rich economies allowed their real 
exchange rate to appreciate and the international competiveness of their non-oil 
tradable sector to erode. Warr (1986) points to other macro-policy interventions to 
maintain international competitiveness. These policies meant that when oil revenues 
diminished the economy had achieved a degree of export diversification, and would 
not face a growth collapse. Moreover, the oil boom of the 1970s and later economic 
diversification helped to maintain buoyant government expenditure, particularly on 
public goods like health and education. 
The success of economic diversification is evident in Table 4. As the economy 
industrialized, during the heyday of the new order development (1975-95), the role of 
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the primary sector including oil sharply declined in the sectoral composition of value 
added. A similar story can also be observed in the changing pattern of exports during 
the period. Furthermore, the contribution of revenue from oil and gas in the state 
budget increased from 9 percent in 1967 to the peak of 62 percent in1981/82 then 
declined to just around 20 percent in 1996/97 (Van Zanden and Marks, 2012). 
 
Table 4. Structural change, 1975-1995 
Sector
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Primary 27.7 20.6 22.2 16.7 11.6 6.0 6.7 6.1 2.3 1.1
Oil, gas, mining 20.5 26.3 14.2 14.6 9.8 73.9 70.8 40.6 27.9 17.3
Petrolium refinery 0.6 0.3 5.0 3.2 2.0 1.0 6.8 23.7 14.4 7.5
Manufacturing 10.9 11.1 13.0 19.1 24.6 9.4 7.4 17.9 38.4 51.1
Electricity, gas , water 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Construction 5.0 5.0 6.6 5.8 6.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Finance and insurance 2.4 2.0 2.6 3.8 4.1 0.0 0.2 2.3 3.0 3.3
Other services 32.6 34.4 36.0 36.2 40.6 9.7 8.1 9.3 14.0 19.7
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Sectoral composition of value added Sectoral composition of exports
 
Source: Jacob (2005: 429-430, based on input-output tables) 
 
 
Diversification was good for the economy, and Suharto hoped to gain political 
leverage from his economic achievements. The growth in the Indonesian economy 
had a high elasticity of poverty reduction and also there was a conscious effort to 
lower regional disparities. Tadjoeddin (2014) demonstrates a clear pattern of income 
convergence across provinces during 1976–96, where initial income levels in 1976 
negatively correlated with the annual growth of per capita Regional Gross Domestic 
product (RGDP) during 1976-96. This means that poorer provinces grew faster than 
richer ones over the course of two decades.
4
 A similar pattern during the period is also 
observable in terms of poverty reduction across provinces (Figure 2). In this regard, 
Hill (2000: 235) notes, ‘there is no case of a high-income province growing much 
faster than the national average, or conversely of a poor province falling sharply 
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behind’. These convergences were achieved through deliberate fiscal equalization 
policies.  
The main instrument of these policies was Inpres (Instruksi Presiden: 
Presidential Instruction) introduced in early 1970s that primarily used resource 
windfalls for the socio-economic development of poorer regions, especially in Java 
island which has the highest concentration (about 70 percent) of population. Investing 
in human capital through education and health spending was the key feature of the 
Inpres and this also played a crucial role in the early economic success of East Asian 
economies (World Bank, 1993). Development expenditure on education and health as 
proportion of the overall development expenditure in the state budget was on the rise 
(UNDP, 2001). The outcome is clear; across district regional inequalities of human 
development related indicators are much lower than that of per capita RGDP (Figure 
3).     
 
Figure 2. Inter-provincial regional convergence, 1976-96 
 
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
0 200 400 600 800 1000
A
n
n
u
a
l 
g
ro
w
th
 o
f 
P
C
 R
G
D
P
 1
9
7
6
-9
6
 
(%
) 
 
Initial PCRGDP 1976 (IDR 000, 1973 prices)
-100
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
0 20 40 60 80 100
R
e
d
u
c
ti
o
n
 i
n
 p
o
v
e
rt
y
 1
9
7
6
-9
6
 (
%
)
Initial poverty HCR 1976 (%)
 
Source: Tadjoeddin (2014: 50-51, Figures 3.2 and 3.3)  
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
4
 This is based on overall per capita GDP including oil and gas. If oil and gas are excluded, inter 
regional provincial inequality of per capita GDP would be much lower, but shows a slightly increasing 
trend during 1980-2000 (Milanovic, 2005).  
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Figure 3. Regional inequalities of selected indicators, 1996 (Theil-L index measure
#
)  
 
 
Notes:  
#)
 Theil-L index in this case is a measure of inter-district inequality of the relevant indicators. Higher 
index means higher inter-district inequality. 
*)
 Without oil and gas and thirteen richest districts. 
 
Source: Tadjoeddin (2014: 52, Figure 3.4) 
 
 
These inter-regional convergences may have been aimed to mollify rebellious 
tendencies from some regions, but eventually resulted in the rage of rich. This is due 
to dissatisfaction on the part of a few regions that produced oil and gas for not 
receiving ‘fairer share’ of their own resource rents because of the new order’s 
equalization policies. These regions articulated heated secessionist sentiments soon 
after the fall of Suharto in late 1990s, a problem that has been largely resolved by the 
country’s moves toward democratization and decentralization (Tadjoeddin, 2014).        
In Zaire, Mobutu did not opt for economic diversification as he feared it would 
strengthen political opposition.  In contrast to Indonesia, he may have had more to 
fear from the new elites that would emerge from any economic diversification. 
However, this argument is not watertight and it can be argued that Suharto discounted 
the future less and hoped to remain in power long so he wanted to stem popular 
discontent and cared less about elite challenges. Suharto’s achievements in economic 
diversification and growth were economically rewarding, but at the end, it turned out 
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to be politically very costly for the regime. The drive for socio-economic development 
and economic diversification created societal bases of power outside the control of 
political elites (Dunning, 2005). These independent bases of power facilitated 
challenges to the political power of state incumbents, especially during the economic 
downturns. The growing middle class in a more egalitarian society, largely resulted 
from the three decades of continuous and broad based socio-economic progress, 
became his nemesis in 1998. The challenge did not come from the Islamists or 
nationalists, two groups that he feared earlier. Suharto, eventually, became the victim 
of his own ‘success’. 
An interesting question could be, how Indonesia now would look line if the 
pattern of stagnant economy during 1950-1966 recording only 1.1 percent of average 
annual growth per capita GDP were continued after 1967? Figure 3 depicts exactly 
such a speculative counterfactual prediction. If it were the case, Indonesia in 2010 
would be poorer than Vietnam or Nigeria.       
 
Figure 4. Real Per capita GDP, 1967-2010 (in 1990 International $)  
 
 
Source: Calculated from Maddison Project Database (http://www.ggdc.net/maddison) 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
In this work we have sketched the build up to the mass killing (politicide) of 
communists and communist sympathisers in Indonesia, during 1965 to 1966. One of 
our contributions is to explain why ordinary individuals, not belonging to the elite, 
might wish to participate in the act of murder. We maintain that this cannot only be 
justified on pecuniary grounds, but also has to be situated in innate behavioural 
factors which also govern individual choices and actions, which we encapsulate into a 
theoretical model. But even innate behavioural actions do not occur in a 
socioeconomic vacuum. This requires the scrutiny of the political economy leading up 
to mass murder. This was a period of economic stagnation and decline in an economy 
that was poor to begin with, which only serves to intensify any existing hatreds and 
polarisation. The mass murder of the communists certainly aided the consolidation of 
the new order regime of Suharto, but his ascension to power has to be seen in the light 
of cold war politics of the time favouring autocratic right of centre military rulers by 
the US, particularly in the context of East Asia where the battle against the alternative 
ideology, communism, was being waged most fiercely.   
Polarisation (ideological or ethnic) combined with economic stagnation, 
domestic political opportunism and external geo-politics favouring a contender 
increases the risk of mass murder, politicide and genocide. Broad based economic 
growth combined with policies of redistribution that diminish political and economic 
polarisation may reduce risks of GMA. 
As described above, the broad based economic growth strategy adopted by 
Suharto, as well as his policies to lower reliance on natural resource based exports, led 
to economic growth in Indonesia, along with poverty reduction and a diminution of 
regional disparities. These policies cannot be inferred to be the consequence of 
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politicide, rather the politicide was a step in the consolidation of power by the new 
regime who sought to obtain legitimacy by offering better economic conditions within 
an authoritarian social contract.   
The contrasting paths taken by Suharto in Indonesia and Mobutu and Zaire are 
also worth highlighting. Economic growth and broad-based socio economic progress 
resulted from the three decade of Suharto’s rule in Indonesia ended in the democratic 
transition when the rising middle class pushed for an endogenous process of 
democratisation, akin to Lipset’s (1960) modernisation thesis, albeit with some 
violence. However, it has to be noted that, the Suharto regime’s consolidation of 
power was rooted in the mass killing of around half a million Indonesians. By 
contrast, the no-diversification and no- development choices followed by Mobutu in 
Zaire only led the country into full blown civil war upon his departure. As 
hypothesized by Collier and Hoefler (2004), the availability of large impoverished 
young men and lootable natural resources along with an ailing economy made civil 
war highly feasible. 
To conclude, over three decades of authoritarian rule in Indonesia did bring 
about broad based economic progress. But the authoritarian contract sustaining the 
regime simply became untenable and the contract lacked credible commitment 
without a transfer of some political power to the new middle classes. This mirrors 
Lipset’s (1960) modernisation theory of endogenous democracy, which states that a 
higher level of income, the pressure for democracy becomes inexorable. But as 
Przeworski and Limongi (1993) argue in some countries the democratic transition 
occurs at a lower level of per-capita income, as seems to be the case in Indonesia, 
compared with other countries in the region such as South Korea and Taiwan. 
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